Violations of the Service Contract Act (“SCA”) Can Lead to Contractor Debarment Absent Unusual Circumstances
“Debarment is frequently described as the "executioner's axe" or the "corporate death penalty" because it can abruptly destroy a company's primary revenue stream and reputation. In government contracting and regulated industries, being barred from doing business with public agencies often proves fatal for organizations that rely on state or federal funds.”
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Last week I wrote a short primer on Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”) debarment. See A Short Primer on Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”) Debarment Standards — Abrahams Wolf-Rodda, LLC. As I noted therein, the Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”) debarment standards are quite different than the Service Contract Act (“SCA”) debarment rules. This blog focuses on SCA debarment.
Under the SCA, a contractor who violates the act is supposed to be debarred “absent unusual circumstances”, a reverse of the DBA debarment standard, which is only for aggravated, willful or repeated violations showing a disregard for the law. The SCA unusual circumstance rule is imposed by an act of Congress, which amended the SCA in the 1970’s to tighten the debarment standards when it was thought the Nixon Administration was being too lax in its enforcement of the SCA.
Like the DBA, contractors and subcontractors found to have violated the SCA are placed on a “blacklist” which is circulated by the Comptroller General to all Federal agencies. 41 U.S.C. §6706. A person or firm appearing on the list, or any firm, corporation partnership or association in which such persons or firms have a “substantial interest” is debarred from contracting with the government (regardless of whether the prospective contract is subject to the SCA) for a three-year period (from the date of publication of the list), unless the Secretary recommends otherwise “because of unusual circumstances.” The decision of the Secretary is subject to review by the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) after a hearing held by an Administrative law Judge (“ALJ”).
In the leading case of A to Z Maint. Corp v. Dole, 710 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1989), the draconian nature of the debarment provision became clear. In 1980, A to Z had been subject to an SCA investigation where it had been ultimately determined that unusual circumstances existed for not debarring the company. Applying a kind of “one-bite” rule, DOL “threw the book” at A to Z for a subsequent SCA violation. An ALJ at DOL found that A to Z should be debarred and the Secretary of Labor agreed. A to Z brought a court action to challenge the debarment. The Court expressed its unhappiness with the harshness of the result but ruled that it was unable to reverse DOL’s decision. The SCA provides for debarment absent “unusual circumstances” and no such circumstances existed here. See also U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Stancil G. Jones, No. 87-SCA-9 (Jan. 25, 1991)(debarment upheld where violations, although admittedly intentional, involved only $4,400.00 in contracts of $87,000.00 affecting 15 workers).
In Florida Transportation Service, Inc., BSCA No. 92-03 (Aug. 31, 1992), the Board of Service Contract Appeals (the predecessor to the ARB) held that, while repeated SCA violations can result in consecutive three year debarments, that is only if each violation is adjudicated separately. One proceeding cannot lead to debarment for more than three years. The Board rejected the petitioner’s contention that his violation arose from a good faith legal dispute since petitioner never discussed his interpretation of the regulations with DOL.
In Crimson Enterprises, Inc., BSCA No. 92-08 (Sep. 29, 1992), the Board reversed the decision of an ALJ who had found all of the requisite indicators of debarment, but who had exercised discretion in not debarring the contractor. The SCA does not allow such discretion, barring “unusual circumstances.” Thus, debarment is technically the default outcome of SCA violations, and not the exception .
In Kleen-Rite Corp., BSCA No. 92-09 (Oct. 13, 1992), the Board held that it is not necessary to define precisely the SCA’s de minimis exception for purposes of debarment, 2% of the contract price was clearly not de minimis. The Board also held that a contractor has no right to withhold wages or fringe benefits pending receipt of payment from another party.
1. What constitutes “unusual circumstances”?
The Secretary of Labor has had frequent occasion to address the question of what constitutes “unusual circumstances” sufficient to prevent debarment. In the oft-cited Washington Moving & Storage Co., SCA-168 (Secy. of Labor, Mar. 12, 1974) case, the Secretary set forth the following guidelines to be considered in determining whether there are “unusual circumstances” warranting relief from the ineligible list sanction:
Whether “unusual circumstances” are present in a case within the meaning of the Act must be determined on-the basis of the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Some of the principal factors which must be considered in making this determination are whether there is a history of repeated violations of the Act; the nature, extent, and seriousness of past or present violations; whether the violations were willful, or the circumstances show there was culpable neglect to ascertain whether certain practices were in compliance, or culpable disregard of whether they were or not, or other culpable conduct (such as deliberate falsification of records); whether the respondent’s liability turned on bona fide legal issues of doubtful certainty; whether the respondent has demonstrated good faith, cooperation in the resolution of issues, and a desire and intention to comply with the requirements of the Act; and the promptness with which employees were paid the sums determined to be due them. It is clear that the mere payment of sums found due employees after an administrative proceeding, coupled with an assurance of future compliance, is not in itself sufficient to constitute “unusual circumstances” warranting relief from the ineligible list sanction. It is also clear that a history of recurrent violations of identical nature, such as repeated violations of identical minimum wage or recordkeeping provisions, does not permit a finding of “unusual circumstances.” On the other hand, where a bona fide legal question of doubtful certainty exists, and an employer reasonably chooses to litigate such question in order to resolve it, this should not prevent a finding of “unusual circumstances.”
See also Quality Maint. Co., SCA-119 (Dec. 28, 1973).
It is clear from the above quoted language, and from other litigated cases, that no single test is necessarily dispositive of the question of whether “unusual circumstances” exist but, rather, the totality of the attendant- circumstances are open to consideration and review. As noted at 29 C.F.R. §4.188(b)(1), however, the legislative history underlying the “unusual circumstances” language makes clear that the drafters intended to limit the Secretary’s discretion to relieve violators from the debarred list. H.R. Rep. No. 92-125 1, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972); S. Rep. No. 92-1131, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972). “The authority [to relieve from blacklisting] was intended to be used in situations where the violation was a minor one, or an inadvertent one, or one in which disbarment . . . would have been wholly disproportionate to the offense.” Proposed Amendments to the SCA: Hearings on H.R. 6244 and 6245 Before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971) (Statement of Congressman O’Hara). The violator of the SCA, moreover, has the burden of establishing the existence of unusual circumstances to warrant relief. Ventilation and Cleaning Engineers, Inc., SCA-176 (ALJ, Aug. 23, 1973) aff’d Secy. of Labor, Oct. 2, 1974.
2. How unusual circumstances plays out depends on the facts.
Nonetheless, as a general rule of thumb, relief from the ineligibility listing/ debarment sanction has been recommended for contractors who cooperate with the government and make a voluntary good faith effort to keep adequate records in order to come into compliance with the SCA and give assurances of continued compliance in the future. See Joy R. Manning, 82-SCA-136 (Sept. 28, 1990) (although contractor failed duty to pay for layover time, debarment was not appropriate in light of previously unblemished record and corrective action taken). However, second violations, even many years after the first, may result in imposition of the sanction. See, e.g., Ray’s Lawn and Cleaning Services, Inc., ARB No. 06-112 (Aug. 29, 2008); Intersec, Inc., SCA-1078, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,312(ALJ, Nov. 14, 1979) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder]; Kolt, SCA-1095 (ALJ, Oct. 22, 1979).
In Dantran, Inc. v. United States, 171 F.3d. 58 (1st Cir. 1999), the court upheld the ALJ’s determination (and reversed an ARB appeal reversing the ALJ) that the contractor should not be debarred because of unusual circumstances. DOL had investigated the contractor in 1989 and found no irregularities in the contractor’s payment practices. In 1991, a second DOL investigator found that the same payment practices did violate the SCA. The contractor immediately revised its policies and began negotiating a settlement. In the meantime, the Secretary froze payments owed to the contractor and the contractor was unable to meet payroll. The Secretary then withheld additional payments and pressed for debarment. The ALJ found a variety of unusual circumstances relieving the contractor from debarment: the contractor’s reliance on the findings of the original investigation; the absence of a willful or deliberate violation of the law; the contractor’s flawless history of compliance; and the contractor’s full cooperation with the Secretary’s investigations.
In Oneida Building Services, Inc., No. 83-SCA-5 (Dep. Secy. of Labor, Jan. 8, 1991), the Deputy Secretary of Labor upheld the ALJ’s order relieving the contractor from the debarment sanction, finding unusual circumstances. The violation resulted from the contractor not paying cashiers for the time spent obtaining change for their cash drawers, and from not requesting approval of an unfunded self-insured plan for part-time employees. As to the fringe benefit violations, the Deputy Secretary of Labor agreed they were de minimis (about $ 9.00 per month for each of 22 employees) and involved a bona fide legal issue of doubtful certainty. As to the cashier violation, only $4,700.00 of back wages was involved. Furthermore, the contractor showed that compliance was achieved without incurring any further costs (change in procedures eliminated the need to get change for cash drawers.) Also, the contractor did not have experience in food service contracts and simply continued the policies and procedures which had been followed by the predecessor contractor. On these facts, the Deputy Secretary found there was no culpable negligent conduct and he ruled that debarment was inappropriate in this case.
In Afghan Carpet Cleaners, Inc., No. SCA-961 (Dep. Secy. of Labor, Feb. 28, 1991), the Deputy Secretary of Labor also found unusual circumstances and characterized the violations as an honest misunderstanding in part due to the contractor’s lack of proficiency in the English language. Certain record keeping violations were deemed not to be deliberate fabrication of records. The Deputy Secretary’s order on Feb. 28, 1991, came almost 13 years after the original complaint was filed and 16 years after the W-H Division investigation.
Another case in which DOL agreed unusual circumstances existed is Action Systems, Inc., Nos. 82-SCA-81 et al. (Jan. 25, 1991). The contractor, performing several janitorial services contracts, cooperated fully with the investigators, promptly paid all amounts found due, consistently implemented procedures designed to avoid future violations, made no attempts to conceal the violation nor acted willfully or deliberately to violate the SCA. The violations involved employees paid at rates lower than their experience required, employees receiving rate increases six months after hire when it should have been forthcoming at the four-month mark and failure to pay pension and fringe benefits. The Deputy Secretary stated that the initial violation- resulted from the contractor’s mistaken belief that compensation depended on contract experience rather than industry experience, and that GSA would bill him for pension benefits due under the Act. According to the Deputy Secretary, “the violations understandably were associated with the ‘start up’ period as [the contractor] became familiar with government contracting.” Thus no culpable conduct was found and debarment was denied.
3. Examples of unusual circumstances.
Other specific circumstances which have been deemed to warrant relief from the §6706 sanction include the following:
•Contractor violation excused because of misunderstanding over whether it was whether it was based on contract experience rather than industry experience. Action Systems, Inc., Nos. 82-SCA-81 et al. (Jan. 25, 1991).
• Insurance fraud and picketing (Jacko, SCA-1019 (ALJ, May 14, 1979);
• Turnover and new type of contract or review system (Batchelor’s Bldg. Maint. Svc., Inc., SCA-958 (ALJ, Jan. 29, 1979); Burns Intl. Sec. Svcs, Inc., SCA-778-783, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,198 (ALJ, June 20, 1978) [1973-1978 Transfer Binder]);
• Language barriers (Resendez, SCA- 1150, id. at ¶31,323 (W.H. Admin., Jan. 10, 1980); Elbado, SCA-932, id. at ¶31,237 (ALJ, Aug. 30, 1978);
• De minimis underpayments (Clarkie’s Inc., SCA-1176 (Aug. 2, 1990));
• Owner unaware of underpayments until five years after they occurred (Complete Bldg. Maint. Co., 84-SCA-11 (July 31, 1990));
• Meager education, ignorance, business ineptitude and inexperience (Cacioppo, SCA-495496 (ALJ, June 9, 1976); Skatell, SCA-991, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,298 (ALJ, Feb. 1, 1979) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder]; Integrated Res. Mgmt., Inc., ARB No. 99-119 (June 27, 2002).
4. Examples that do not meet the definition of unusual circumstances
However, most gross errors are not excused. In Dept. of Labor v. Colorado Security Agency, Inc., No. 85-SCA-53 (Secy. of Labor, July 5, 1991), the Secretary of Labor rejected the contractor’s arguments that the violations of the SCA should be excused because he thought workers compensation insurance satisfied the health and welfare benefits requirements, and because he was a fast time federal contractor. The Secretary of Labor ruled that being a first time federal contractor cannot be the basis for relief from the sanctions of the SCA, even debarment, where, as in this case, the violations were serious, affecting many employees, and involving a significant amount of money ($45,437.67 to 180 employees).
Financial problems, including embezzlement by the company bookkeeper, are also generally insufficient grounds to justify relief. See, e.g., Soledad Enterprises, Inc., SCA-574-578 (ALJ, Mar. 14, 1977) [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,091, aff’d, id. at ¶31,169 (W.H. Admin., Jan. 31, 1978); Yotgin , SCA-715, id. at ¶31,179 (Secy. of Labor, Apr. 19, 1978); see also Aarid Van Lines, Inc., SCA-423-425, id. at ¶31,1801 (Secy. of Labor, Apr. 4, 1978) (no relief for reliance on advice of accountant who was also a lawyer). But compare Kiaain, SCA-930, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,228 (ALJ, Aug. 24, 1978) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] (no debarment where reliance on accountant and corrective steps taken).
Problems of a more personal nature are also unlikely to result in relief under the “unusual circumstances” test. See, e.g., Ventilation and Cleaning Engineers, Inc., SCA-176 (Secy. of Labor, Oct. 2, 1974) 2 Lab. L. Rep., Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶26,718.65 (absence from country due to spouse’s illness); DeGuzman, SCA-987 (W.H. Admin., July 24, 1979) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,286 (marital discord). But see Williams, SCA-897-898 (ALJ, Aug. 18, 1978), id. at ¶31,220 (relief is proper where violations due to official’s failing health); George Poitras, Inc., SCA-956 (ALJ, Oct. 4, 1978), id. at ¶31,236 (relief is proper where there is an absence from the office and a lack of attentiveness due to family problems).
Error by the government or reliance on information provided by DOL has warranted relief from the debarment sanction in some cases. See, e.g., Jets Svcs. Inc., SCA-208 (ALJ, Nov. 30, 1973) 2 Lab. L. Rep., Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶26,718.61; Fischer & Assoc. Tech. Consultants, Inc., SCA-662, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,208 (W.H. Admin., Aug. 18, 1978) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder]; Cylinder Maint. Corp., SCA- 1072 (ALJ, July 5, 1979), Hap-Joy Enters., Inc., SCA-979 (ALJ, Nov. 9, 1978), id. at ¶31,243.But in other similar cases, such error or reliance has been insufficient to warrant relief from the sanction. See, e.g., Industrial Crating & Packing Inc., SCA-162, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶26,718.60 (Secy. of Labor, Apr. 10, 1974) (contractor knew of error at the time it entered into the contract); Security Sys., Inc., SCA-774-775, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,302 (W.H. Admin., Jan. 19, 1979) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] (bid papers correct, despite contracting officer’s error). Moreover, the government’s knowledge of errors or failure to uncover violations during investigations will not warrant a recommendation of relief. M.&R. Allen, Inc., SCA-579-583 (W.H. Admin., July 23,1979), id. at ¶31,304; Bouchet, SCA-165, 2 Lab. L. Rep. Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶26,718.62 (ALJ, Jan. 23, 1973). But compare Gaylord & Assoc. Corp., No. 85-SCA-19 (Sec. of Labor, July 17, 1991) (in refusing to find that unusual circumstances existed, the Secretary of Labor rejected as a defense that the contractor was paying his employees in accordance with the direction of the contracting officer; the Secretary of Labor cited 29 C.F.R. §4.187(e)(5) which specifically precludes such a defense).
5. What is a bona fide legal issue of doubtful certainty?
As noted in the above quoted language of Washington Moving & Storage case, the existence of a “bona fide legal question of doubtful certainty,” is another general category of “unusual circumstances” which may justify relief.
An ALJ does not have the authority to rule on the validity of the debarment regulation and the tree-part test for “unusual circumstances” supporting relief from debarment. However, in Administrator, Wage and Hour Div., USDOL v. Price Gordon, LLC, ARB No. 2019-0032 (Mar. 9, 2020), it was held that the ALJ’s analytic approach was harmless error where he applied the relevant factors and considerations.
In the hotly litigated Midwest Maint. & Constr. Co. case the contractor denied allegations of SCA violations, alleging the existence of such a question by contending that both the solicitation and the contract contained no wage determination for the locality in which the work was performed and that, therefore, the FLSA minimum wage controlled. The ALJ found that the company had relinquished its rights , however, by not inquiring about the omission. The district court upheld the ALJ’s theory of “relinquishment,” stating that it had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s decision on the sanction. Midwest Maint. Co. v. James, 84 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ¶33,685, 23 W.H. Cases (BNA) 918 (W.D. Okla. 1978). On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction and rejected the “relinquishment” theory. The appellate court held that “Midwest had the right, but not the obligation, to seek clarification of the bid invitation and contract.” Accordingly, the appeals court set aside the debarment sanction. Midwest Maint. & Constr. Co. v. Vela, 621 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1980).
In Sidney W. Johnson, 81-SCA 1390 (Dep. Secy. of Labor, Sep. 28, 1990), the contractor was relieved of debarment by the Deputy Secretary based on his finding of “unusual circumstances.” The principal issue in the case was the contractor’s obligation to pay for “layover time” for drivers on a mail delivery contract. The Deputy Secretary upheld the contractor’s obligation to pay for the layover time but held that the matter of having to pay for such layovers had not previously been well-established and thus constituted a “bona fide legal question of doubtful certainty.” For this reason, the Deputy Secretary found that unusual circumstances existed sufficient to relieve the contractor from debarment.
For other “bona fide legal questions,” see Florida I.Q. Computer Co., SCA 737, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,188 (ALJ, May 31, 1978) [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] (issues of coverage and computation justify relief); Burns Security Systems, Inc., SCA-150 (ALJ, Apr. 30, 1973) (liability under the contract an issue); Sentinel Protective Services, Inc., SCA-1012, 2 Wages-Hours (CCH) ¶31,330 (W.H. Admin., Oct. 2, 1979) [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] (pay requirement for weapons check-out a doubtful legal issue). Compare Ahola Corp., SCA-936 (ALJ, Oct. 18, 1978), id. at ¶31,247 (holiday pay, total package not legal issues).
6. What else constitutes a mitigating factor?
In VGA Inc., ARB No. 09-077 (Sept. 29, 2011), the Board held that payment of back wages due is not a mitigating factor to avoid debarment when compared to other aggravating factors including limited cooperation during the investigation, a delay in coming into compliance, and a previous SCA debarment. A similar conclusion was reached in Administrator v. Tri-County Contractors, Inc., ARB No. 11-014 (June 29, 2012). In the latter case, the ARB said: “While it is true that Tri-County paid the money due its employees, nevertheless, as the ALJ properly noted, the ‘Respondents impeded the second investigation by failing to keep accurate time records and by denying for several months that employees’ hours had been computer-generated when this was in fact the case’.”
In Southwest Security Svcs., Inc., Case No. 2008-SCA-11 (OALJ, Sept. 9, 2011), the ALJ held that the contractor could not be relieved from debarment despite its argument that its violation was de minimis since it represented only .001% of the contractor’s payroll for the investigation year. The ALJ reject this argument because the contractor had been investigated for SCA violations on twelve separate occasions prior to the instant case, and several of the investigations involved SCA violations of the same nature as those found in the instant case and had received Wage and Hour publications on compliance with the SCA after the prior investigations. Individual officers of the company were spared from debarment because the ALJ found that the individual with sole responsibility for payroll decisions was deceased.
In Administrator v. J.N. Moser Enterprises, Inc., Case No. 2009-SCA-00009 (OALJ, June 5, 2012), the ALJ found that the non-payment of wages was not excused by the company’s insolvency, which resulted from the Postal Service’s failure to pay the amounts due under 16 contracts, because the contractor should have arranged a loan from a bank and not relied on timely payments by the Postal Service as its only source of funding. Furthermore, even after the insolvent company had sold off the trucks it was using to perform its mail delivery contracts, it still did not pay its employees.
Conclusion
The SCA regulations, predominantly codifying the above-referenced principles, provide detailed criteria for applying the “unusual circumstances” test. See 29 C.F.R. §4.188(b)(3).
In sum, the SCA debarment standard vests considerable discretion in DOL. Congress specified the unusual circumstances test and thus put its finger on the scale. As a result, the case law is relatively capricious, with some contractors getting relief from debarment while others are held to the strict language of the statute. This makes it even more important in dealing respectfully with the DOL investigator and cooperating in the resolution of cases where there is any SCA violation. The consequences of violating the SCA are so great, that it is important not be too argumentative, albeit it is also important to articulate the bona fide good faith defenses the contractor may have. It is a tough balancing act. For these reasons it is a good idea to engage competent counsel to assist the contractor in resolving any SCA investigation.